for the logic. We give truth values to all the sentences of our language via an interpretation function ν such that ν(A) ∈ {t, f,b,n}. We define the behavior of the standard connectives in the following way.
• The value of a conjunction, ν(A ∧ B), is the greatest lower bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• The value of a disjunction, ν(A ∨ B), is the least upper bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• The value of a negation ν(¬A) = ν(A) whenever ν(A) ∈ {b, n}, otherwise it toggles t and f.
Importantly, the material conditional (A ⊃ B) is defined in the standard way as ¬A ∨ B. A common view is that Nāgārjuna uses the negative catuskoti in order to underscore the view that ultimate reality, or paramārtha-satya, is fundamentally ineffable. Consider the application of the negative catuskoti to the proposition that Buddha exists:
We do not assert 'empty'. We do not assert 'non-empty'. We neither assert both nor neither. They are asserted only for the purpose of designation. (MMK,
XXII, 11)
The proposition has none of the four truth values present in the positive catuskoti. So, Garfield and Priest, following Sylvan, suggest a fifth truth value, e, to represent the transition to the ultimate perspective -called 'the great death' by Jōshu. This ordering on values is not, strictly speaking, a lattice since e is meant to be incomparable to the other values. How then do sentences receive this value? We introduce a new valuation function, µ (indicated by the arrows) which maps all values in the set {t, f,b,n} to e. Moreover, if µ(ν(A)) = e, then µ(ν(¬A)) = µ(ν(A∧ B)) = µ(ν(A∨ B)) = e. The negative catuskoti utilizes µ on the positive values to yield the denial of the entire conventional picture. 1 Given the truth functions defined by Garfield and Priest, the material conditional is the only candidate available. With additional resources (e.g. non-normal frame semantics), a basic relevant conditional could be modeled. For difficulties regarding this approach, see discussion in §3 below. In any case, conditionals are clearly beyond the scope of Garfield and Priest's aims in their paper. Table 2 : the great death Since truth and falsity are themselves merely part of the conventional picture, the negative catuskoti is meant to explicitly say the unsayable, to truly say what cannot truly be said. So, there is a self-undermining paradoxical nature to the negative catuskoti as well. The next stage of awakening for Nāgārjuna is the realization that the distinction between conventional and ultimate reality is itself a convention. This has sometimes been referred to as 'the emptiness of emptiness'. But in the above table, µ(e) is undefined, and so a new ordering must be defined. In the final stage, when one has appreciated the fact Table 3 : the emptiness of emptiness that distinction between the conventional and the ultimate is itself 'empty', the usefulness of negative catuskoti, and so µ, becomes null. Garfield and Priest represent this as a lattice with the µ-arrows removed, but with the 'empty' value still present. Such is the extent of Garfield and Priest's presentation. would represent a kind of trivialism -the thesis that every sentence is designated -a view argued against by Priest [5] . 2 Moreover, it appears that Nāgārjuna viewed the negative catuskoti as a kind of denial, and Priest and Garfield see µ as a kind of 'external' negation. 3 Hence, one would assume that e is undesignated.
Under these assumptions, it will be useful to consider what argument forms are valid and invalid in such a logic. In doing so, we will see that the lattices as presented cannot be extended to a charitable interpretation of the logic in MMK. In what follows, I shall assume that we should attribute Nāgārjuna as endorsing valid arguments whenever pos-sible. 4 In determining valid inferences for this logic, I will restrict my attention to tables Since the material conditional is just a disguised disjunction, modus ponens will fail as well. Given the semantics for FDE, modus ponens is not valid in the framework. Such instances of modus ponens in M M K should give us pause. 5 Nāgārjuna's preferred logic ought to make such arguments valid.
We also have a failure of modus tollens in the framework. This passage is clearly made up of two instances of modus tollens, which again Nāgārjuna appears to take as valid.
Further, we also have the failure of hypothetical syllogism: MMK is rife with hypothetical syllogism. Indeed, Robinson [6] claims that "the hypothetical syllogism is Nāgārjuna's principal form of inference" (196 In any case, moving to a relevant logic is unnecessary; in §4, I present a simple reinterpretation of Garfield and Priest's lattices which validates all these inferences using the material conditional.
Even on the relevant conditional semantics for F D E, some conditional-free inferences (primarily disjunctive syllogism) would still be problematic. Moreover, we still have the failure of reductio ad absurdum: As Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest [3] note, reductio arguments (in Sanskrit, prasaṅga) are used throughout MMK. For example, the entirety of MMK V is intended as a reductio. 9 But if, according to the conventional perspective, contradictions are to be tolerated, in what sense is a reductio ad contradictionem a reductio ad absurdum? Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest [3] address this question directly. Their response is that while the given argument form is, strictly speaking, invalid, one can still force one's opponents to concede a consequence which by their lights is unacceptable, whether it is contradictory or not. This may well be so, but it does not appear to save reductio as Nāgārjuna uses it, unless there is some independent reason the contradiction's conclusions are not to be accepted.
It may also be objected that the reductio arguments are not intended to establish the negation of a proposition, but merely to provide reasons for rejecting that proposition.
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This response, however, would only be successful if one, in the conventional perspective, could distinguish between rejection and accepting a negation. I tentatively suggest that this distinction is not present in the conventional perspective, but only arises out of the transition to the ultimate perspective. 11 This seems to be the whole point of the positive catuskoti.
Are these arguments part of upāya -teachings which are, from the ultimate perspective, false but useful for a better understanding than the one currently had? If so, one may wish to endorse a part of the conventional perspective in order to allow it to lead one to a deeper understanding. Could this be the case with the invalidity of such argument forms?
Unfortunately, no. This interpretation of Nāgārjuna would make sense if these argument forms were valid from the conventional perspective, but invalid from the ultimate perspective. In that case, these argument forms could be considered upāya; acceptable for teaching but ultimately to be rejected. But as we have seen, according to Garfield and Priest's interpretation, the positive catuskoti makes these argument forms invalid from the conventional perspective. What's more, it turns out these forms of argument are valid from the ultimate perspective. So let us turn to that now.
We have seen that the negative catuskoti amounts to a rejection of all sentences using µ, our external negation, and a new value e. Let us abbreviate the claim that an argument from a set of premises X to a conclusion A is valid according to these semantics thus: X e A. Remember that µ(ν(A)) = e for every atomic A, and whenever µ(ν(A)) = e,
Thus, any nonempty set of premises X can never be designated. It follows that every valuation according to which X is designated (there are none) will be one where a conclusion A is designated. Thus, it turns out that every argument from nonempty X to A is valid.
(6) X e A for all A and nonempty X .
Notice that this result does not turn on our earlier assumption that e is undesignated. For if e were designated, then every sentence would be designated, and hence every argument from X (whether empty or not) to A would be non-vacuously valid.
A Proposal
In light of these problems, I want to suggest a gloss on the important work that Garfield and Priest have done. Indeed, the following proposal is really just a natural extension of some suggestions that Garfield and Priest have made elsewhere. There are two thoughts that led me to the proposed gloss.
The first comes from some textual evidence that the positive catuskoti is fundamentally a tool used by Nāgārjuna to undermine the conventional perspective; it is not the conventional perspective itself. If this is right, then the FDE lattice is not the correct account of conventional truth values.
The second thought comes from suggestions made in Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest [3] and in Garfield and Priest [4, 8] to the effect that contradictions as applied to conventional reality are merely prima facie. It is suggested that these contradictions need to be disambiguated between the conventional and ultimate perspectives and their distinct notions of truth.
Thus, something may be true (conventionally), false (ultimately), true and false (conventionally and ultimately, respectively), and neither true nor false (ultimately and conventionally, respectively. ( [4] , 2) This suggests that the positive catuskoti is really an intermixing of perspectives, and not constitutive of the conventional perspective itself. There is more evidence that this interpretation of MMK is correct. Garfield and Priest [8] suggest such an interpretation is supported by the fact that Nāgārjuna never explicitly endorses a contradiction at the level of conventional reality. Second, as we have already noted, Nāgārjuna takes reductio arguments to be decisive against his opponents. As such, it seems he cannot be committed to the possible truth of contradictions in the conventional picture. So, we can represent the order on these values by the following lattice.
〈1, 0〉
〈1, 1〉 〈0, 0〉
〈0, 1〉 We include semantics for the connectives as follows.
• Where ν(A) = 〈x, y〉, the value of the negation ν(¬A) = 〈1 − x, 1 − y〉.
The only significant change from the Dunn semantics above is the treatment of negation. Here, negation toggles 〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉 similar to the Dunn semantics, but also toggles 〈1, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉. This reflects the suggestion emphasized by Garfield and Priest [4, 8] that
Nāgārjuna never explicitly endorses contradictions from the conventional perspectives.
According to our semantics for negation, a proposition and its negation may never both be conventionally true.
To fully explicate the logic, we need to specify designated values and consequence.
Since the primary purpose of the positive catuskoti is to adopt the conventional perspective (if only to undermine it) we take conventional truth as designated. That means that any truth value which has 1 as its first member should be designated, otherwise not. So, 〈1, 1〉 and 〈1, 0〉 are designated values. On this semantics, we define conventional validity ( B4 ) in the usual designation-preserving way: an argument from X to A is conventionally valid (X B4 A) iff whenever ν(x) is designated for all x in X , so too is ν(A) designated.
It is important to notice that the B4 semantics for the connectives on this lattice generates a fully classical propositional logic, according to which disjunctive syllogism, modus ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism, and reductio are all valid. More specifically, these semantics are a four-valued Boolean algebra, and hence validate all the same inferences as is two-valued counterpart -the standard classical semantics. It is worth noting that we have not yet discussed the relation between 'true' and 'not false', nor the relation between 'false' and 'not true'. It is plausible to assume that from the conventional perspective, being false is equivalent to being not true. The distinction between 'false' and 'not true' is, in part, what is supposed to result from attending carefully to the positive uses of the catuskoti. So, in short, a 1 in the first argument place of a truth value denotes conventional truth and a 0 in the first argument place denotes conventional falsity (which is just to say conventional untruth). Of course, from the conventional per-spective, the above semantics dictates that a proposition and its negation are never both conventionally not true. But this is to be expected, if falsity is conventionally identical to untruth. The result is that a proposition and its negation may never be both conventionally untrue because they may never both be conventionally false. This is simply because conventionally (i.e. classically) the falsity of A implies the truth of ¬A, and the falsity of ¬A implies the truth of A. In other words, if we allowed conventionally false contradictions, we would be forced to accept conventionally true ones.
On the other hand, from the ultimate perspective, the negative catuskoti teaches us that being not false is not the same as being true. What the positive catuskoti adds to the conventional perspective is the possibility of rejecting or denying propositions and their negations. So, in an important way, our truth values build an external negation into the ultimate perspective. Since a 1 in the second place denotes 'not ultimately false' this need not imply that anything is ultimately true. Taking this external negation seriously moves us from positive catuskoti to negative catuskoti, as understood by Garfield and Priest, since the attitude there is rejection all the way down. It may be objected, that the above semantics appears to imply that no proposition and its negation may both be ultimately not false. 13 Here, I think, it is important to see that the above semantics is useful only for positive uses of the catuskoti. Negative uses are best understood via Garfield and Priest's µ valuation function and the value e.
In summary, Garfield and Priest's series of lattices are best understood as models of the stages of awakening, but do not give adequate models for valid inference. In order to extend their account to valid inference, one must see that pure conventional reality only includes two truth values, t and f, and that Nāgārjuna's logic is entirely classical. The pos-itive catuskoti utilizes ambiguity between the conventional and ultimate perspectives, as outlined using the B4 semantics. The logic here is still fully classical. Once the transition is made to negative uses of the catuskoti, we employ a new valuation function µ and a new semantic value e corresponding to 'emptiness'. This leads us directly to the full ultimate perspective.
